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In July 2011, the Pakistani public learnt that the CIA had used a vaccination
campaign as cover to capture Osama Bin Laden. The Taliban leveraged on this infor-
mation and launched an anti-vaccine propaganda campaign to discredit vaccines and
vaccination workers. We evaluate the effects of these events on immunization by imple-
menting a Difference-in-Differences strategy across cohorts and districts. We find that
vaccination rates declined 12 to 20% per standard deviation in support for Islamist
parties. These results suggest that information discrediting vaccination campaigns can
negatively affect trust in health services and demand for immunization.
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1 Introduction
Vaccines are responsible for some of the largest improvements in welfare in human history.
A current example is the development of the Covid-19 vaccine, which is expected to be the
key in ending one of the deadliest pandemics in recent history. Despite all the benefits that
immunization can generate for society, some people remain skeptical and hesitate to get vac-
cinated or to administer vaccines to their children. This is the case even for well established
vaccines, such as those for measles or polio, that have proven their safety and effectiveness
for decades. Low levels of immunization coverage in certain groups of the population have
led to numerous outbreaks of measles in the last decades.1 Vaccine skepticism has oftentimes
been fueled by groups ideologically opposed to vaccines, which have spread misinformation
about vaccines. A strong anti-vaccine movement has emerged in the US and Europe, while
religious extremist groups have engaged in anti-vaccine propaganda in countries such as
Nigeria, Afghanistan, or Pakistan.2
Despite the potential negative implications of generalized vaccine skepticism, we have a
limited understanding of how the disclosure of information that discredits vaccines affects
immunization rates and demand for formal medicine more generally. In this paper, we exploit
a sequence of recent events in Pakistan that negatively affected the population’s confidence in
vaccines. As part of the operations to capture Osama Bin Laden in 2011, the CIA organized
an immunization campaign as cover for their espionage activities. The objective was to
obtain DNA samples of children living in a compound in Abbottabad where Bin Laden was
suspected to hide. This would have allowed the CIA to obtain definite proof that Bin Laden
was hiding there. In July 2011, two months after the actual capture of Bin Laden, the British
newspaper The Guardian published an article reporting on the vaccine ruse and describing
the collaboration of a Pakistani doctor with the CIA.3
The disclosure of this information caused uproar in Pakistan. Leveraging on the new
piece of information, the Pakistani Taliban launched an anti-vaccine propaganda campaign
to discredit medical workers and to cast doubt on vaccines. They accused health workers of
being CIA spy agents4 and claimed that the polio vaccination campaigns were a conspiracy
1BBC 2019 “Measles cases quadruple globally in 2019, says UN” https://www.bbc.com/news/health-
47940710 (last accessed 07/16/2019).
McNeil Jr., Donald G. 2019. “Measles Outbreak Now at 880 Cases, With Fastest Growth Still in New York”
https://nyti.ms/2Enz9sC (last accessed 07/16/2019)
2See Kennedy (2016).
3Shah, Saeed. 2011. “CIA organized fake vaccination drive to get Osama bin Laden’s family DNA”.
The Guardian, July 11. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/11/cia-fake-vaccinations-osama-bin-
ladens-dna (last accessed 07/18/2019).
4Walsh, Decan. 2012. “Taliban Block Vaccinations in Pakistan”. The New York Times, June 18.
https://nyti.ms/2nrYKJM (last accessed 07/18/2019).
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to sterilize the Muslim population.5
In this paper, we evaluate how the disclosure of the vaccine ruse and the subsequent
anti-vaccine propaganda campaign affected immunization rates and other forms of health
seeking behavior. Our main results on vaccination rates take advantage of a rich household
survey that contains detailed immunization records for a large sample of children, as well as
precise information on their date of birth. We implement a Difference-in-Differences strategy
across cohorts and districts. The cohort variation is indicative of the children’s exposure to
the new information. In particular, we distinguish between fully-exposed, non-exposed, and
partially-exposed cohorts depending on the fraction of their early months in life that were
spent under the new information scenario. The geographic variation allows us to compare
the evolution of immunization rates across regions with different levels of ideological affinity
to the Taliban. Parents in districts with higher support for Islamist groups are likely to have
been more exposed to the anti-vaccine propaganda campaign. Furthermore, it is likely that
parents with an initial ideological affinity to the Taliban granted greater credibility to their
anti-vaccine messages.6
Our estimates indicate that the disclosure of the vaccine ruse had substantial negative
effects on vaccination rates: districts in the 90th percentile of the distribution of Islamist
support experienced a decline in vaccination rates between 23% and 39% relative to districts
in the 10th percentile of Islamist support. The results are highly statistically significant
and robust to the inclusion of a host of controls, including district and monthly-cohort fixed
effects. We provide several pieces of evidence that are consistent with the assumption of a
lack of pre-existing trends.
We also present evidence of effects on disease prevalence. Exploiting variation at the
district and year level, we find that a one standard deviation increase in support for Islamist
groups is associated with an increase in 0.8 cases of polio per district, which is equivalent to
duplicating the average number of cases per district.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the disclosure of the vaccine ruse
damaged the reputation of vaccines and formal medicine. There is substantial anecdotal
evidence supporting this interpretation. These accounts oftentimes describe the vaccine ruse
as the triggering factor and the Taliban propaganda as fueling vaccine skepticism. We review
this anecdotal evidence in the background section.
We provide a number of additional exercises to shed light on the mechanisms driving
our results. First, we provide evidence that our estimates on vaccination rates are mainly
5Roul (2014).
6This could be the result of confirmation bias (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) or of inference on the
quality of the source of the propaganda messages (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006).
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explained by changes in the demand for vaccines rather than changes in supply. Using
detailed administrative data on the timing and scope of vaccination drives, we show that the
intensity of vaccination activities did not systematically differ across districts with different
levels of Islamist support after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. We also show that our
results on vaccination rates are robust to flexibly controlling for these detailed measures of
vaccine supply. Furthermore, we provide evidence that households’ health seeking behavior
changed in a way that is consistent with a lower demand for formal medicine: households
became less likely to consult formal doctors when their children got sick and were more likely
to use informal doctors and traditional birth attendants.
Second, we provide a number of pieces of evidence that are consistent with the Taliban’s
propaganda playing an important role. We show that our effects are driven by districts where
a large fraction of people do not trust or consume mainstream media. These people tend to
rely more on religious leaders, or word of mouth to get information on events in Pakistan.
While we do not have a precise measure of the extent to which parents were exposed to
Taliban propaganda, we construct a proxy computing the fraction of the population that
get their news mainly from religious leaders and also express support for the Taliban. Our
estimates indicate that vaccination rates experienced larger declines in regions where this
share of the population is larger. We also show that the negative effects on immunization
rates are larger for girls than for boys. This result is consistent with some parents granting
greater credibility to the rumor spread by the Taliban that the polio vaccine was intended
to sterilize Muslim girls. Finally, we also provide suggestive evidence that the reduction in
the demand for vaccines is likely to be driven by the ideological affinity to Islamist groups
and not by fear or intimidation of the Taliban.
This paper is related to the literature that has investigated the determinants of demand
for health care in developing countries. See Banerjee and Duflo (2011) and Dupas and
Miguel (2017) for literature reviews. This literature has found that individuals oftentimes
exhibit low levels of demand for highly effective treatments. While the reasons are varied,
misconceptions about the effectiveness of these treatments and skepticism regarding their
benefits are common. Vaccines are a key product for which skepticism abounds. In such
contexts, the level of trust in health workers and in medical treatments is oftentimes described
as fundamental to achieve good public health outcomes.
Despite the seemingly wide consensus on the importance of trust for demand of health-
care, there is limited empirical evidence documenting this relationship.7 Only recently, two
7The medical literature has examined the correlates to vaccine hesitancy and has tested a number of
interventions to reduce it. See Sadaf et al. (2013) for a literature review. Das and Das (2003) examine
the determinants of the demand for vaccination in a case study from one Indian village. They show that
vaccination rates declined after two mothers died while in labor. The authors argue that these effects could
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contemporaneous papers studied the consequences of medical malpractice on trust and de-
mand for formal medicine. Alsan and Wanamaker (2017) study the disclosure of the Tuskegee
study, in which a number of Black males that suffered from syphilis were denied medical
treatment in order to investigate the effects of the disease. The authors find that Black men
living close to Tuskegee later developed lower levels of demand for formal medicine. Lowes
and Montero (2020) study the long-run effects of the French colonial campaigns against the
sleeping sickness in Central Africa. They exploit cross sectional variation in the location of
the colonial campaigns and find negative long-run effects on health outcomes.8
We contribute to this literature by exploiting the disclosure of information that directly
damaged the reputation of vaccines and examining immunization rates as our main outcome
of interest. Given the inherent difficulties in inferring the effectiveness of vaccines based on
own-experience, shocks to the reputation of vaccines can be especially damaging. We differ
from previous literature by studying a context where an ideologically-motivated group was
actively spreading misinformation about vaccines. In our empirical design, we exploit the
ideological connection to this group and cohort variation as our key drivers of treatment
intensity, rather than demographic characteristics or cross-sectional factors.
The presence of an active political group trying to discredit the reputation of vaccines
also connects this paper to the literature on persuasive communication. See DellaVigna and
Gentzkow (2010) for a literature review. This literature has mainly focused on the effects of
media or advertising on consumer and voter behavior. To the best of our knowledge, no study
has documented the effects of propaganda campaigns against vaccines—or of information
lending credibility to such campaigns—on immunization rates.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the political and administrative context of Pakistan. Sections 3 and 4 present
the data and empirical strategy. Sections 5 and 6 present the main results and robustness
checks. Section 7 discusses evidence on the mechanisms. Section 8 concludes.
be explained by an increase in mistrust in the midwife’s recommendation to vaccinate the children.
8See also Gonzalez-Torres and Esposito (2018). They show that the attempts to contain the Ebola
epidemic generated civil conflict in the areas where mistrust in government was higher.
9The paper is also related to the literature that has studied the determinants and implications of anti-
Americanism or anti-Western values. See for instance Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004), Beath, Christia and
Enikolopov (2017), Cantoni et al. (2016, 2017), and Bursztyn et al. (2020).
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2 Background
2.1 The Vaccine Ruse
In the summer of 2010, the CIA obtained intelligence that Bin Laden could be hiding in a
compound located in the city of Abbottabad, Pakistan. During the following months, the
CIA surveilled the compound in a number of ways, such as via satellite images and from a
nearby house. Yet, prior to launching an operation that would entail invading the territory
of Pakistan, a critical partner of the US in the region, the CIA wanted to obtain definite
proof that Bin Laden was hiding there. To this end, the CIA organized a vaccination ruse.
The objective was to obtain DNA samples of children living in the compound and compare
them to the DNA of Bin Laden’s sister, who had died in Boston in 2010. Obtaining proof
that the children were related to Bin Laden would have been telling evidence that Bin Laden
was hiding in the compound.10
To carry out the vaccine ruse, the CIA recruited a Pakistani doctor, Dr. Shakil Afridi.
The doctor, in turn, hired low-ranked health workers, who were unaware of the espionage
motives behind the vaccination campaign. Without knowledge or consent from the Pakistani
health authorities, Dr. Afridi and his team started administrating hepatitis B vaccines to
children living in a poor neighborhood of the city in March 2011. A few weeks later, the
team moved to Bilal Town, a rich suburb of the city, where the suspected compound was
located. Allegedly, one of the nurses gained access to the compound. However, whether the
operation succeeded in obtaining DNA samples of children in the compound is still unclear.
On May 2011, U.S. special forces carried out an attack on the compound resulting in the
killing of Osama Bin Laden. A few months later, on July 11th of 2011, the British newspaper
The Guardian published an article describing the vaccine ruse.11 The article described the
collaboration of Dr. Afridi with the CIA and the attempts of health workers to obtain DNA
samples from children.12
The involvement of health personnel in the operations to capture Osama Bin Laden was
intensely criticized, both in the US and in other countries.13 In January 2013, the deans
10Shah, Saeed. 2011. Op. cit.
11Ibid.
12In January 2012, the U.S. Defense Secretary confirmed that Dr. Afridi had collaborated with the CIA.
The doctor was accused of conspiracy against the state and was sentenced to serve 33 years in jail.
Mazetti, Mark. 2012. “Panetta Credits Pakistani Doctor in Bin Laden Raid”. The New York Times, Jan-
uary 28. https://nyti.ms/2yo1VEi (last accessed 07/18/2019).
Boone, Jon. 2012. “Doctor who helped US in search for Osama Bin Laden jailed for 33 years”. The
Guardian, May 23. http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2012/may/23/doctor-bin-laden-cia-jail (last ac-
cessed 07/18/2019).
13Leslie F. Roberts, Professor of Columbia University’s School of Public Health argued “Forevermore,
people would say this disease, this crippled child is because the U.S. was so crazy to get Osama bin Laden.”
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of twelve leading public health schools sent an open letter to President Obama protesting
against the use of vaccination programs in espionage activities.14 In response to these cri-
tiques the White House announced that the CIA had pledged not to use vaccination programs
as a cover to gather intelligence or genetic material.
2.2 Political Context in Pakistan
Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy which had held regular election since the end of the
Musharraf regime in 2008. Between 2008 and 2018, two main political forces have been
alternating in power: the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)—a center-left political party—
and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)—a right-wing nationalistic party. A number of
smaller political parties also participate in elections. Between 2002 and 2008, the main six
Islamist parties contested elections forming the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition.
These parties strongly emphasize Islamist moral and principles in every day life.
Several authors have documented the close political, financial, and ideological connec-
tions between MMA and the Pakistani-Taliban. For instance, many of the Taliban leaders
have been educated in the madrassas run by some of the Islamist parties that form MMA.
Also, MMA leaders have been observed attending the funerals of Taliban combatants. Both
Taliban and MMA flags were displayed during these funerals (Norell (2007), page 75). While
the support of MMA to the Taliban is not official, the electoral support of MMA predomi-
nantly consists of individuals that are sympathetic to the Taliban and support their fight in
Afghanistan (Norell (2007), page 71).
MMA obtained 11% and 3% of votes in the 2002 and 2008 general elections, respectively.
Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of support for MMA in the 2008 election across
districts. While the average vote share was low, there was wide variation. In some districts
MMA’s vote shares was above 20%. Importantly, MMA did not manage to control any of
the local executive governments after the 2008 election.
2.3 The Pakistani Taliban’s Anti-Vaccine Propaganda
Islamist groups in Pakistan have repeatedly tried to discredit formal medicine and vaccines.
By discrediting services provided by the state, the Taliban can increase the reliance of the
Scientific American. 2013. “How the CIA’s Fake Vaccination Campaign Endangers Us All”. Scientific Amer-
ican, May 1. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-cia-fake-vaccination-campaign-endangers-us-
all/ (last accessed 07/18/2019).
14Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2013. “CIA Vaccination Cover in Pak-
istan”. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, January 8. https://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-
releases/2013/klag-CIA-vaccination-cover-pakistan.html (last accessed 07/18/2019).
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population on non-state actors (Acemoglu et al. 2020). Taliban leaders spread their messages
through Friday prayers in radicalized mosques, radicalized newspapers, and illegal radio
shows.15 For instance, the Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah claimed during his radio show
that the polio eradication campaign was part of a “conspiracy of Jews and Christians to
make Muslims impotent and stunt the growth of Muslims” (Roul (2014), page 18). Islamist
groups have also argued that vaccines should be avoided because they were made out of
pig fat—and hence forbidden for Muslims—and because it is un-Islamic to “take a medicine
before the disease [is contracted.]”16 The concern that vaccines are a conspiracy to sterilize
Muslim children, girls in particular, has been recurrent.17
In this context, the disclosure of the CIA vaccination ruse had the potential to generate a
large impact because it lent credibility to many of the Taliban’s arguments against vaccines.
Several scholars and journalists have made this observation.18 For instance, in an article
published in The Guardian the following was argued:
“However the ruse has provided seeming proof for a widely held belief in Pak-
istan, fuelled by religious extremists, that polio drops are a western conspiracy to
sterilise the population.”19
While the vaccine ruse only provided seeming confirmation for some of the rumors—those
linking vaccination drives to espionage activities—, it is likely that all other claims made by
the Taliban gained credibility as well.
The Taliban reacted to the disclosure of the vaccine ruse by intensifying their propaganda
campaign against vaccines. They leveraged on their new credibility and issued a number of
religious edicts (fatwas), directly linking vaccination campaigns to espionage activities by
the CIA.
“According to a Taliban fatwa issued in June 2012, “polio agents could also be
spies as we have found in the case of Dr. Shakil Afridi.””20
15Siddiqui, Taha. 2014. Op. cit.
16Nishtar (2009); Siddiqui, Taha. 2014. Op. cit.
Saleem, Sana. 2011. “Muslim scholars fight to dispel polio vaccination myths in Pakistan”. The Guardian,
November 4. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/nov/04/polio-vaccination-pakistan,
(last accessed 07/18/2019).
17Scientific American. 2013. Op. cit.
18Saleem, Sana. 2011. Op. cit.; Roul (2014)
Shah, Saeed. 2012. “CIA tactics to trap Bin Laden linked with polio crisis, say aid groups”. The
Guardian, March 2. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/02/aid-groups-cia-osama-bin-laden-
polio-crisis (last accessed 07/18/2019).
19Shah, Saeed. 2012. Op. cit.
20Roul (2014), page 18.
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The Taliban have also exerted violence against vaccination workers. Seventy health
workers had been killed during a campaign of violence that started in July 2012.21 Taliban
leaders also boycotted immunization campaigns by banning immunization drives. These
boycotts and many of the attacks took place in the FATA region, which is not included in our
study sample.22 Furthermore, our main analysis focuses on children born between January
2010 and July 2012, hence, before the violence campaign against vaccination workers started.
Nevertheless, we discuss the intimidation of health workers as an alternative channel for our
effects on vaccination rates later in the paper.23
Since mid-2012, vaccination campaigns have also aimed at addressing misconceptions
about vaccines by engaging local community and religious leaders during vaccination drives.
Vaccinators have been equipped with fatawa (religious) books and videos on their mobile
phones that describe vaccines as being safe and in accordance with Islamic precepts. Immu-
nization workers show these materials to parents that hesitate to vaccinate their children on
the grounds of religious concerns.24
2.4 Propaganda and Vaccine Skepticism
There is substantial anecdotal evidence that the messages spread by the Taliban fueled
vaccine skepticism among parents. For instance, an article under the title “We Believed Our
Cleric” narrates the story of a father that did not vaccinate his son in 2012 and who later
became paralyzed from poliomyelitis.25
“Hamid Aziz says he listened to the advice of a cleric in his village, who an-
nounced over loudspeakers of the madrasah, a local Islamic religious school, that
the vaccine was “not good” for children’s health, and prevented it from being
administered to any of his sons.
21The first attack happened in July 2012 in the city of Karachi, the capital of Sindh province. In De-
cember 2012, coordinated attacks took place in several districts during a national vaccination drive (Roul
(2014)). BBC. 2015. “Four kidnapped polio workers are found dead in Pakistan”. BBC, February 17.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31507217 (last accessed 07/18/2019).
22See section 3 for further details on our study sample.
23In April 2013, the Pakistani Taliban pledged not to interfere with the polio vaccination drives as long as
the drives were not used for espionage purposes and the vaccine was manufactured in accordance with Islamic
laws. However, the conflict between the Taliban, the Pakistani government, and the US has continued to
affect the immunization campaigns, predominantly in the FATA region (Roul, 2014; Ahmad et al. 2015).
24Khan, Taimur. 2017. “How Pakistan got to near zero on polio”. www.devex.com, November 14.
https://www.devex.com/news/how-pakistan-got-to-near-zero-on-polio-91521 (last accessed 07/18/2019).
Khan et al. (2017).
25Synovitz, Ron and Ahmad Ullah. 2017. “‘We Believed Our Cleric’: Pakistani Polio Vic-




(...) Nooran Afridi, a pediatrician at a private clinic in Pakistan’s Khyber tribal
region, says one of the biggest obstacles to eradicating polio in Pakistan has been
‘refusals’ stemming from ‘antipolio propaganda’ spread by conservative Islamic
clerics in ‘backward areas.’ ”26
Some of these anecdotal accounts describe skepticism against the vaccine—such as ques-
tioning whether vaccines are safe or in accordance with Islam. However, others reported
sources of skepticism related to health workers—such as arguing that they may be spies. It
is likely that both sources of skepticism were present and reinforced one another.27
2.5 Immunization in Pakistan
Children in Pakistan typically receive three main vaccines at a young age through routine
immunization activities: the vaccine against poliomyelitis (or polio vaccine), the DPT (vac-
cine against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) vaccine; and the measles vaccine. Pakistan
follows the recommended vaccination calendar of the World Health Organization and the
first dose of most of these vaccines is supposed to be administered shortly after birth. See
Appendix Table 1 for details on the immunization calendar.
Lady Health Workers are the health workers responsible for child immunization. These
workers are assigned to a local health facility and each of them is responsible for, approxi-
mately, 1,000 people or 150 homes. They regularly visit households to provide information
on family planning and to immunize children according to the vaccination schedule.28
However, the main way in which Pakistani children are immunized are through vacci-
nation drives. There are national as well as subnational immunization days during which
vaccinators (typically lady health workers joined by other volunteers) provide vaccines at
households’ doorstep. These activities are organized by the Expanded Program on Im-
munization of Pakistan (EPI, henceforth) which is financed by the federal government of
Pakistan. The supply of polio vaccine plays a special role in the EPI activities. Pakistan is
one of the only two countries in the world in which the poliomyelitis virus is still endemic.29
26Ibid.
27One may have expected the vaccine ruse to only affect distrust against health workers. After all, the
vaccines distributed during the ruse were, to the best of our knowledge, safe. However, once there are seeds
of distrust on medical practitioners, naturally parents would also question the adequacy of the product that
practitioners recommend. Hence, it is difficult, both conceptually and empirically, to disentangle between
distrust on health personnel and on vaccines.
28The Lady Health Worker program was established in 1994 by the federal government. Since 2010, the
provision of health public goods is a provincial responsibility. In 2014, there were, approximately, 110,000
Lady Health Workers in Pakistan. See Andreoni et al. 2016 for additional details and for the effects of
improvement in the monitoring technology on their activities.
29The other country where polio is still endemic is Afghanistan.
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There are additional polio-vaccination campaigns that take place every month in most dis-
tricts. They typically last for 3 days and target all children up to age 5 in the respective
district. All the vaccines provided during immunization drives or at public health facilities
are free of charge.
3 Data
Our main data source is the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM),
a household survey provided by Pakistan’s Bureau of Statistics. This survey contains
individual-level data on the vaccination status of each child living in the household. For
our main results we focus on waves 2010/11 and 2012/13, which cover the events of interest.
Children are geo-coded at the district level. We focus on children living in the 115 districts
that belong to the four provinces of Pakistan—Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab,
and Sindh— and the capital city of Islamabad, which contain 97% of the population.30
Our baseline sample records the vaccination status of 18,795 children born between Jan-
uary 2010 and July 2012 that were up to 24 months old at the time of the interview. Our
main outcomes correspond to whether a child has received the first dose of the polio, DPT, or
measles vaccine, respectively. Restricting the sample to young children and focusing on the
first dosages provides a tighter prediction of how the events described in this paper affected
children’s vaccination status. However, we also present results for full immunization rates
— i.e., receiving all dosages of each vaccine.
The survey records vaccination status with one of the following three options: 1) yes
(as verified on the vaccination card by the enumerator); 2) yes, based on parent’s recall; 3)
no. In order to minimize the scope for misreporting we do not rely on recall measures of
vaccinations.31 Our main outcome variable is an indicator variable that takes value one if
the enumerator was able to verify that the vaccine was provided in the vaccination card, and
30Note that the data is not available for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or the semi-
autonomous territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. These areas regularly experienced conflict
during this time and the Pakistani government did not have full control of their territory. North and South
Waziristan are not included in our sample since they were part of the FATA region during our study period.
31Vaccination status based on recall has been shown to be subject to a large extent of measurement error
(Research and Development Solutions (2012); Sheikh et al (2011)).
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zero otherwise.32,33
As a measure of support for Islamist groups, we collected electoral data from the 2008
legislative elections, which were the closest in time that preceded the disclosure of the vaccine
ruse. The data provide vote shares at the electoral constituency level, which are smaller than
districts. We aggregate the results at the district level in order to merge the electoral data
with our household survey data.34 Our main measure of support for Islamist groups is the
vote share of the Islamist coalition MMA. Figure 1 presents the geographic distribution of
the district-level vote shares for MMA in the 2008 election.
For the purpose of this project, we also collected administrative data on the polio vac-
cination campaigns that were conducted between 2008 and 2013 throughout Pakistan.35
These data contain district-month measures of whether a polio vaccination campaign was
conducted, the type of campaign—national or subnational immunization days—, and the
number of children targeted.
See Appendix Table 2 for descriptive statistics and Appendix Table 3 for a tabulation
of the cohorts included in our baseline sample. We use some additional datasets that we
describe as they become relevant. For an exhaustive description of the data used in this
paper see section 2 of the Online Appendix.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our objective is to evaluate the effect of the disclosure of information about the vaccine
ruse and the subsequent anti-vaccine propaganda on immunization rates. Our working as-
sumption is that the date of birth and the district of residence jointly determine children’s
exposure to the shock induced by the disclosure of the vaccine ruse.36
32By focusing on verifiable vaccination status we mitigate the concerns of measurement error due to over-
reporting of vaccination status. However, it is possible that we are still subject to under-reporting. Parents
may say they do not have the vaccination card if they want to hide that they vaccinated their children. We
believe that it is unlikely that under-reporting affects our results: the percentage of parents that self-reported
not to have vaccinated their children against polio is low—3.6%—and was even lower in the 2012/3 wave.
This suggests that over-reporting is a more relevant issue than under-reporting. Furthermore, note that the
share of parents that are in possession of the vaccination card does not change after the disclosure of the
vaccine ruse. See section 6 for further discussion.
33In the case of the polio vaccine the survey contains an additional possible answer: “4) yes, during polio
campaign”. This option is self-reported by parents and, hence, equivalent to option (2) above.
34In particular, for each district and party, we compute the weighted average vote share across all con-
stituencies within a district. We use constituency population as weights. We obtain these data from the
Electoral Commission of Pakistan.
35These data was kindly provided by the internal monitoring and surveillance unit at the National Emer-
gency Operations Centre within the Expanded Program on Immunization in Pakistan.
36Note that the survey does not record the date when the vaccine was provided to the child. We only
observe whether a child has been previously administered the vaccine at the time of the interview.
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Next, we discuss how cohort of birth determines the exposure to the shock. We begin
by documenting when children typically receive the different vaccines. Figure 2 presents
age profiles of the immunization rate for each vaccine in the pre-treatment period.37 These
figures show the percentage of children that had taken the first dose of each vaccine by their
month of age at the time of interview. The first panel of Figure 2 presents the age profile of
the polio vaccine. While the polio vaccine is supposed to be administered at birth, the age
profile indicates that most children receive their first dose during the first three months of life.
During this period, parents are likely to experience opportunities to vaccinate their children
(e.g. during vaccination drives), and a fraction of them agree to vaccinate their children. The
age profile also reveals that the probability of having received a vaccine reaches a plateau
after the third month. This suggests that parents are likely to have decided whether or not
to vaccinate their child after the kid’s third month of life: additional time does not seem to
further increase the probability of vaccination.
Given this age profile, we are going to consider the first three months of life of children as
the critical window when parents typically decide whether to administer the polio vaccine to
their child. The greater the fraction of this period that takes place after the disclosure of the
vaccine ruse, the greater the predicted exposure to the information shock. Hence, children
born after July 2011 are considered fully exposed : their entire childhood takes place after
the information had been disclosed. Children born in the three months before July 2011 are
considered partially exposed : only a fraction of the three-month critical window takes place
under the new information scenario. Children born before the critical window are considered
non exposed : the parents of these children are likely to already have taken the decision of
whether to administer the polio vaccine or not by the time the information is disclosed.38
The age profile for DPT—presented in the second panel of Figure 2—is very similar to
the one for the polio vaccine. Hence, we rely on the same definitions of cohort exposure as
for polio. The age profile for the measles vaccine—third panel of Figure 2—shows that the
probability of receiving the first dose rapidly increases after the 9th month—which is the
official age of vaccination—and reaches a plateau after the first year of life. Hence, when
considering the measles vaccine, we will consider children born in the year prior to July 2011
as partially exposed and children born prior to July 2010 as non-exposed.39
37In particular, we restrict the sample to PSLM waves 2008/09 and 2010/11. The latter wave was fielded
before June 2011.
38Note that the non-exposed cohorts are not a pure control group since parents parents can always decide
to vaccinate their children at later ages. However, the fact that the vaccination age profiles reach a plateau
is suggestive of parents not being eager to vaccinate their children after a certain point, which is likely to
remain the case after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. Hence, these cohorts provide a good approximation
to a control group.
39Note that the age profiles are produced using pre-treatment survey waves. Hence, our classification of
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Our main empirical strategy consists of comparing vaccination rates across cohorts of
children with different levels of exposure to information on the vaccine ruse, and across
districts that have different levels of support for Islamist parties. In order to provide a visual
representation of the sources of identifying variation, Figure 3 presents the age profiles of
children observed before and after the disclosure of information and across regions with
different levels of support for Islamist parties. The left-hand side figures restrict the sample
to districts in the first quartile of the distribution of support for Islamist parties. The figures
on the right show the age profiles for districts in the top quartile of the distribution of support
for Islamist parties.
In districts with low support for Islamist parties, the age profiles are similar before and
after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. In contrast, in regions with high support for Islamist
groups, the age profile shifts downward, indicating a decline in the likelihood of vaccination
at different ages. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that, in regions with high
levels of support for Islamist groups, a larger fraction of parents were exposed to the anti-
vaccine propaganda spread by the Taliban or were more persuaded by it. As a result, a
larger fraction of parents became skeptical about vaccines, and decided not to vaccinate
their children.40
Regression Framework
While the previous results are a transparent way of illustrating the main source of vari-
ation, they do not control for differences across districts or cohorts. Next, we present our
more rigorous econometric specifications.
First, we implement a Difference-in-Differences (DID, henceforth) strategy were we com-
pare vaccination rates between fully-exposed and non-exposed cohorts. Note that, to provide
a stark comparison, we exclude partially exposed cohorts from the sample. We estimate
Yikaj = βPostkIj + γk + γj + γa + δci + εikaj (1)
where Yikaj is a dummy that captures the vaccination status of child i, born in month-year
k, interviewed at age a, and living in district j. Postk takes value 1 for cohorts fully exposed
to the disclosure of the vaccine ruse—that is, children born after July 2011—, and takes
value 0 for non-exposed cohorts. Ij is the district-specific measure of treatment intensity,
cohorts by exposure to the shock is done only on the basis on when did children receive their doses prior to
the treatment. Also note that the age profiles report the prevalence of vaccinations for children of different
ages at the time of interview, hence belonging to different cohorts. That is the reason why for a few instances
the vaccination rates of older children seem lower than their one-month-younger counterparts.
40The reason why the decline in vaccination rates is highest for older children is because they are born at
a time closer to the disclosure event—July 2011. As we show later in the paper, the effects are the largest
for these cohorts.
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i.e. our proxy of support for Islamist parties. We define this measure in terms of standard
deviations of the electoral support for Islamist parties, in order to facilitate the interpretation
of the magnitudes. γk are month-year cohort fixed effects. γj are district fixed effect. γa are
monthly age-at-interview fixed effects. ci represents individual-level controls (in particular,
month-of-interview fixed effects to control for seasonality and an indicator for rural regions).
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.41
Cohort fixed effects control for all factors that are common for all individuals in a cohort,
such as nation-wide economic growth or improvements in health and nutrition over time.
District fixed effects control for time-invariant factors such as geography, climate, or reli-
giosity. The inclusion of these rich controls strengthens our confidence that the remaining
variation captured by our interaction term PostkIj captures the effects of exposure to the
information scenario post-disclosure of the vaccine ruse. The main identifying assumption
is that, in the absence of the disclosure of the vaccine ruse, the across-cohorts evolution
of vaccination rates would have been similar in districts with different levels of support for
Islamist groups.
For some of our outcomes of interest, we will exploit time instead of cohort variation.
For instance, we will examine effects on cases of polio at the district and month level. In
those cases we estimate the following related specification:
Ytj = βPost July 2011tIj + γt + γj + εtj (2)
where Ytj is the outcome of interest of district j, observed at time t; Post July 2011t for
periods after July 2011; Ij is electoral support for Islamist parties in standard deviations; γt
are time fixed effects; γj are district fixed effects.





βkDkIj + γk + γj + γa + δci + εikaj (3)
where Dk is a dummy indicating whether the child belongs to month-year cohort k. The other
variables are the same as those defined in equation (1). The coefficients β̂k capture the cohort-
specific treatment effects. Since these are allowed to fully vary, we incorporate partially
treated cohorts in this analysis and empirically study the magnitude of their effects. The
omitted category corresponds to the last cohort of the non-exposed cohorts (i.e., February
41A few districts have experienced divisions during our study period. We cluster the standard errors at
the level of the 110 districts in existence in 2008.
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2011 for polio and DPT and June 2010 for measles).
The pattern of β̂k offers a first check on the validity of the identification assumption. In
the absence of pre-existing trends in vaccination rates that correlate with Islamist support,
we expect to find no effects for non-exposed cohorts, i.e., β̂k ≈ 0. For fully-exposed cohorts,
we expect β̂k < 0, as exposure to the news of the vaccine ruse and the Taliban propaganda
would make some parents reluctant to vaccinate their children. For partially treated cohorts
we also expect negative effects, as part of their early months in life take place under the new
information scenario.
5 Results
Effects on Immunization Rates
Table 1 presents the main DID estimates that result from estimating equation (1). Panel
A presents the β̂ coefficients when the outcome variables are indicators of having received
the first dose of different vaccines. All the estimates are negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level: a one standard deviation increase in the support for Islamist groups is
associated with declines in vaccinations rates of 5.8 percentage points for the polio vaccine
and of 5.4 for the DPT, and measles vaccines. These declines are large in magnitude. They
represent 12% to 20% declines in vaccination rates over the corresponding sample means.
Column 4 shows that exposed cohorts are 5.7 percentage points less likely to have received
the first dose of the three vaccines. This effect represents a 23% decline over the sample
mean.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the effects on receiving all dosages of each vaccine. In column
4, we present the results on complete immunization defined by receiving all dosages of the
three vaccines. The effects are similar in magnitude to those for the first dosage. Since
the number of observations is smaller—as there are more partially treated cohorts—, in the
remainder of the paper we focus on first doses. Further results on full immunization can be
found in the Online Appendix.
Overall, the estimated effects are highly statistically significant and large in magnitude.
They are consistent with the hypothesis that the disclosure of the vaccine ruse and sub-
sequent propaganda had severe negative consequences for immunization rates. Note that,
the declines in effective protection against these diseases are likely to be even larger since
these estimates do not take into account the externalities generated by individual decisions
to refuse vaccination.
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Next, we provide estimates of the flexible DID specification described in equation (3).
Figure 4 plots the β̂k coefficients, which capture the cohort-specific treatment effects. The
shaded horizontal lines capture the predicted pattern of coefficients. Consistent with what
we expected, the estimates for non-exposed cohorts fluctuate around 0 and do not follow
any specific trend. This finding constitutes a first validity check supporting our main identi-
fication assumption of a lack of pre-existing trends. The estimates for fully-exposed cohorts
are negative and large in magnitude. They indicate a reduction in the likelihood of immu-
nization between 4 and 12 percentage points. The estimates corresponding to the partially
exposed cohorts are also negative. Given the limited number of partially exposed cohorts
for the polio and DPT vaccine, it is demanding to see a clean monotonic pattern. For the
measles vaccines, for which we have a larger set of partially exposed cohorts, we observe a
more clear downward trend in the treatment effects of partially exposed cohorts. This is
consistent with stronger negative effects for the partially exposed cohorts that are exposed
to the new information for a longer period of time during the first months of life.42,43
Overall, the pattern of cohort-specific treatment effects is broadly consistent with the
hypothesis that the disclosure of information on the vaccine ruse and the subsequent anti-
vaccine propaganda, led to a reduction of parental confidence in vaccines and health workers.
In section 7 we provide further supporting evidence for this channel.
Heterogenous Effects by Gender
Next, we examine whether our baseline results are heterogenous as a function of the
child’s gender. Our prior is that the decline in vaccination rates should be larger for girls
than for boys, since a number of rumors spread by Islamist groups claimed that vaccines
42Note that the March 2011 coefficient in the polio and DPT figures is larger in magnitude than expected.
As a result, we do not observe a clear declining pattern in the coefficients for partially exposed cohorts. This
is likely due to idiosyncratic factors in the estimation of this specific coefficient. Appendix Figure 4—which
includes 90% confidence intervals—indicates that this estimate has the largest standard errors. Moreover,
the expectation to document exclusively monotonic patterns is likely very demanding given that only a few
cohorts are predicted to be partially exposed in the case of the polio and DPT vaccine. In the case of
immunization outcomes for which we have a larger number of partially exposed cohorts, we do observe a
clearer monotonically decreasing pattern of estimated treatment effects. See for instance the results for the
measles vaccine in Figure 4 or the results for full immunization in Appendix Figure 6. Finally note that in
the presence of measurement error in the date of birth, our predicted window of partially exposed cohorts
would naturally expand.
43In order to examine the medium-run effects, in Appendix Figure 10 we extend our analysis to a larger
set of fully-exposed cohorts. The results indicate that, while cohorts born around the time of the disclosure
show persistent lower vaccination rates, those born after mid-2012 experience a mitigation of the negative
effects. One possible explanation is the fact that, starting in mid-2012, vaccination workers have directly
attempted to address misconceptions by involving religious leaders that endorsed the usage of vaccines. See
section 8 for further discussion.
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were a conspiracy to sterilize Muslim children, girls in particular. We further discuss this
result in our mechanism section 7.
We empirically investigate this hypothesis by adding a triple interaction
Post×Islamist support×female where female is an indicator for whether the child is female.
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that the decline in immunization was indeed larger
for girls. The triple interaction is negative for all vaccines and statistically significant for
polio and DPT. This indicates that girls’ vaccination rates declined by 3 additional per-
centage points, relative to the vaccination rate of boys. Note that the double interaction of
Post×Islamist support is negative for the three vaccines. This indicates that boys were also
negatively affected by the disclosure of the vaccine ruse, but to a lesser extent than girls.
Effects on Number of Polio Cases
Next, we examine whether the drop in vaccination rates was accompanied by an actual
increase in disease prevalence. We focus on the number of cases of poliomyelitis at the district
and year level for years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2014. Unfortunately, we were unable to find
comparable data for other diseases.44
We implement the Difference-in-Differences strategy across years and districts described
by equation (2). In particular, our dependent variable corresponds to the number of cases
of polio in each district and year and our main regressor is the interaction between the vote
share of Islamist parties and an indicator for years 2011 and 2014.45
Column 1 of Table 3 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in support for
Islamist parties is associated with an increase in the number of cases of polio of about 0.83,
which represents a 93% increase over the sample mean. In column 2, we decompose the
effects by year and we show that the positive effects are driven by years 2011 and 2014.
The fact that the coefficient on 2010 is small and insignificant supports the parallel-trends
assumption.
In the next columns, we present an additional exercise to assess how the magnitude of
the increase in the disease relates to the drop in vaccination rates. First, we compute the
the district-level polio vaccination rate for children younger than 2 years of age before and
after July 2011. In column 3 we show the result of regressing the number of polio cases
44We obtained data on the number of cases of polio through the Expanded Program of Immunization.
The data available for the other diseases was of insufficient quality to grant a meaningful regression analysis.
See section 2 of the Online Appendix for details.
45Ideally, this dummy would take value one only after July 2011 but, unfortunately, we do not have data
on cases of poliomyelitis at the month level. However there is evidence that suggests that most of the cases of
poliomyelitis in 2011 took place in the second half of the year. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
Weekly, Vol. 62 No.17, May 2013. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6217.pdf Figure in page 337
(last accessed 07/05/2019).
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on the polio vaccination rate, and controlling for year and district fixed effects. While the
point estimate is negative, it is small and insignificant. However, the coefficient is likely to
be upward biased, as there may be greater efforts to vaccinate children in areas were the
disease is more prevalent. In column 4, we present the result of an instrumental variable
strategy where we instrument the vaccination rate with the interaction Post July 2011 ×
IslSup. This exercise is valid under the assumption that, conditional on district and year
fixed effects, the aforementioned interaction only affects the number of cases of poliomyelitis
through its effects on the vaccination rate. The resulting estimate is negative, significant,
and large in magnitude. The estimate suggests that a one percentage point increase in the
share of children that have received the polio vaccine decreases the number of cases by almost
half a case.46
These results suggest that the fall in immunization rates in areas with high support
for Islamist groups may have generated breeding ground for the disease to spread. While
observed poliomyelitis cases are relatively infrequent during this period, the magnitude of
the increase in polio cases suggest that the decline in immunization rates may have had
serious health and welfare consequences for a highly vulnerable population.47
6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present the main robustness checks. Additional tests and analysis can be
found in section 3 of the Online Appendix.
No Evidence of Pre-Existing Trends
The main identifying assumption behind our empirical strategy is that, in the absence
of the disclosure of the vaccine ruse, the across-cohorts evolution of vaccination rates would
have been similar in districts with different levels of support for Islamist groups.
The evidence presented in Figure 4 is supportive of this assumption. The estimates for
the non-exposed cohorts fluctuate around zero and do not follow any specific pattern. The
p-values of joint-significance of the coefficients of non-exposed cohorts are 0.69, 0.21, and
0.19 for the polio, DPT, and measles vaccines, respectively. In addition to this, in Appendix
Figure 7, we incorporate data from an earlier wave of the PSLM survey to show a longer
sequence of pre-treatment coefficients. While the pre-treatment coefficients more distant
46Column 5 shows the first stage of the instrumental variable strategy, which is strong according to
conventional levels.
47Note that, on average, only 1 out of 200 children infected with the polio virus shows visible symptoms.
Accordingly, even a single case of the disease indicates that the virus can be widely spread in a community.
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from the vaccine ruse are more noisily estimated, they fluctuate around zero and do not
follow any systematic pattern.
In Table 4, we assess the robustness of our results to flexibly control for a number of
factors that could generate differential trends across districts. Column 2 incorporates as
controls the average value of the dependent variable for non-exposed cohorts, interacted
with yearly-cohort fixed effects. Column 3 controls for the share of mothers with low access
to health services and column 4 controls for the share of mothers with no formal education,
both variables interacted with cohort fixed effects. In column 5, we incorporate controls
for local economic conditions. Using data from satellite images we compute the level of
luminosity for each district and year. We incorporate the resulting variable as a control for
the year and district of birth of each child in our sample. In columns 6 and 7, we explore
whether incidence of conflict affects our results.48 In column 6, we control for the number of
conflict events that occurred in a child’s district of residence during her first year of life. In
column 7, we construct a measure of pre-treatment conflict and interact it with yearly-cohort
fixed effects. All results are highly robust to the inclusion of these controls, which suggests
that it is unlikely that our results are driven by omitted variable bias.
In section 3 of the Online Appendix, we present a number of additional tests. For
instance, we show that our estimates are unlikely to be affected by selective migration. We
also present a number of tests on the quality of our measurement of the vaccination status. In
particular, we mitigate the concern that under-reporting of vaccination outcomes is affecting
our results by showing that there is no increase in the share of parents who claim not to
have vaccinated their children. Furthermore, we show that there are no differences across
districts in the effect of the vaccine ruse on the propensity to hold a vaccination card.
7 Mechanisms
The results presented in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that the disclosure
of the vaccine ruse, and the subsequent Taliban anti-vaccine propaganda campaign, eroded
the population’s degree of confidence in vaccines and in health workers. In this section,
we provide further evidence supporting this mechanism and we evaluate the validity of
competing explanations. Note that in section 1 of the Online Appendix we present a model
of Bayesian updating that formalizes the mechanism that, we argue, is behind our results.
48We construct different measures of conflict (contain battles, violence by non-state actors, and violence
against civilians) using the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Our results are robust
to using measures of conflict that involve the Taliban as an actor.
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7.1 Are Effects Driven by Demand for or Supply of Vaccines?
In this subsection we discuss a number of analyses that suggest that the decline in vaccination
rates is associated with changes in the demand for vaccines, i.e., by parents reducing their
levels of vaccine acceptance. While we cannot completely rule out that supply factors played
some role, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that these factors are the driving
force behind our results.
Effects on Health Seeking Behavior
If the disclosure of information eroded the level of trust in vaccines and in the medical
sector, we may expect that households also reduced their demand for other health services.
Next, we assess the effects on different measures of health seeking behavior. We estimate
equation (2) where we substitute the cohort with the time dimension. While we lose our
rich and detailed cohort variation, we believe the evidence is still indicative of changes in
parental responses after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse.49
First, we examine the effects on the type of medicine that parents consulted when their
children felt sick. In column 1 of Table 5, we first examine the effects on incidence of sickness:
the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child was sick in the two weeks prior to
the survey. The results indicate that there is a slight differential increase in the probability
that children are sick in the areas with high support for Islamist parties. However, what is
more noteworthy is the type of medical assistance that parents sought. In columns 2 and 3,
we restrict the sample to children that reported being sick in the last two weeks. Since this
is a selected sample, we estimate a Heckman 2-stage selection model. Column 2 shows that
parents in areas with high support for Islamist groups were less likely to consult someone
regarding the sickness of their child. Column 3 indicates that this was driven by a lower
likelihood to consult formal medical workers. Instead, parents became more likely to access
non-formal medicine, such as spiritualists, homeopaths, chemists, or other. In column 4
we examine another measure of access to informal medicine. The dependent variable is an
indicator for whether the family was assisted by a traditional birth attendant in the birth of
their youngest child.50 The results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in support
for Islamist groups is associated with a 3.8 percentage point increase in the probability of
being assisted in labor by a traditional birth attendant. This represents a 11% over the
49We control for quarter-year of interview fixed effects, district fixed effects and individual-level controls
(dummy for rural region and monthly age of child). We focus on the same sample of children included in
our immunization results but retaining in the sample partially treated kids in a cohort sense. The results
are similar if we drop children partially treated in a cohort-sense.
50For this specification we exploit cohort-district. See the table notes for details. Note that there are no
effects on the number of births in health facilities.
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sample mean.
The decline in household contact with formal medicine and the increased reliance on
informal medicine is consistent with a decline in the level of confidence in formal medicine
after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. Note that while these measures are typically initiated
by parents—hence, demand driven—we cannot completely rule out that the availability of
these services played some role. Next, we empirically examine whether changes in the supply
of health services could have influenced our results.
Controlling for Supply of Vaccines with Administrative Data
An alternative explanation for our main results is that the supply of medical services may
have endogenously reacted to the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. Starting in mid-2012 the
Taliban carried out attacks against health workers. Hence, vaccination campaigns may have
been more difficult to conduct in regions with higher Islamist support. However, a supply
reaction is unlikely to fully account for the estimates presented in this paper, mainly for two
reasons. First, our sample period precedes the campaign of violence against health workers:
our main results include cohorts born up to July 2012.51 Second, the region that suffered
the most intense violence —i.e., the FATA region—is not part of our estimating sample.
In order to assess the relevance of a supply mechanism, we collected administrative data
on immunization drives, which are the main venue through which children are immunized.
We obtained the data from the Expanded Program on Immunization. They contain the
number of polio vaccination drives that took place in Pakistan in each month and district
between 2008 and 2013. First, we verify that the number and scope of vaccination drives did
not change differentially across districts after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. The results
are presented in Appendix Table 11.
Next, we verify that our main estimates are robust to controlling for measures of supply
of vaccines. The results are presented in Table 6. Column 1 presents the baseline results
for comparison. In columns 2 to 5 we incorporate controls for the number of immunization
campaigns and the number of targeted children per capita. For each child in our sample,
we construct the corresponding average measure of supply of vaccines during her first three
months of life or during her first month of life in her district of residence. The results are
highly robust to controlling for these measures of supply of health services.
Finally, note that the heterogenous effects by gender are not fully consistent with a supply
channel. It is unlikely that vaccination workers had a differential propensity to vaccinate
51Furthermore, the effects for cohorts born after July 2012 seem to be lower in magnitude—i.e., less
negative—and, hence, not fully supportive of a decline in supply of vaccines after July 2012. See Appendix
Figure 10 and section 3 of the Online Appendix for details.
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girls versus boys. Hence, the stronger negative effects on girls are more supportive of the
hypothesis that the decline in vaccination rates was driven by a drop in demand.
7.2 Unbundling Demand
In our main analysis we use the vote share to Islamist parties as a main measure of support
for the Taliban, which may also proxy for exposure and persuasion effects of anti-vaccine
propaganda. This measure has the advantage of being standard in the way it is measured and
being available for all districts. However, it may bundle different district and household char-
acteristics. This makes it difficult to assess the channel behind our results. To “unbundle”
the different channels, we leverage data collected for a research project by Fair et al. (2015),
which was graciously shared by the authors. These data consist of a large household survey
conducted with 7,648 individuals in 79 districts in the year 2013. The survey contained a
number of detailed questions on media consumption, support for different political groups,
and knowledge of different events. Using these data, we provide several pieces of suggestive
evidence that are consistent with the relevance of the anti-vaccine Taliban propaganda. One
caveat of this analysis is that the survey on media consumption and attitudes was collected
after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. Hence, these measures may be endogenous to the
shock. While we believe that our analysis mainly relies on cross-sectional variation that
may not change much over time, the results should be considered as providing suggestive
evidence.
Media Consumption and Exposure to Radicalized Information Sources
One important question for our analysis is whether the effects are driven by the disclosure
of the vaccine ruse or by the subsequent anti-vaccine propaganda. Since mainstream media
had a good coverage of the vaccine ruse, if this information was the main driver of our effects,
we would expect greater effects in regions where people consume and trust more mainstream
media. In contrast, if exposure to Taliban propaganda was the main driver, we expect to
find the opposite.
Using the Fair et al. (2015) data, we compute the fraction of respondents that get their
news from informal sources, such as religious leaders, traditional gatherings, or family mem-
bers. In particular, we focus on the share of respondents that explicitly say that they do
not get their news from mainstream media sources such as, Pakistani public or private tele-
vision channels or Pakistani English or Urdu newspapers.52 We also compute an alternative
measure with the fraction of people whose most trusted source of news is an informal source.
52See section 2 in the Online Appendix for precise variable definitions.
23
Then, we re-estimate our main regression, replacing our measure of support for Islamist
groups with either measure of media consumption.
Table 7 shows the results. We find that lack of exposure or lack or trust on mainstream
media are predictive of larger declines in immunization rates. These results suggest that
access to mainstream information on the vaccine ruse or other events is unlikely to explain
our effects.53 The effects are consistent with access to “alternative”, more informal sources
of information leading to declines in trust in vaccinations. While we should interpret these
results with caution—they may not capture causal effects of information exposure—, the
results are broadly consistent with our proposed mechanism.
Support for the Taliban and Exposure to Anti-Vaccine Propaganda
Next, we examine whether individuals with greater exposure to Taliban propaganda
exhibit larger declines in vaccination rates. First, using the Fair et al. (2015) data, we
compute the share of people for whom religious leaders are their main source for information
and who express support for the Pakistani Taliban.54 Column 4 of Table 7 indicates that
the larger the fraction of respondents in this category, the larger the declines in vaccination
rates. This is consistent with exposure to Taliban propaganda being a relevant driver of our
results.
Our second proxy of exposure to Taliban propaganda consists on being aware of US-led
drone attacks against Taliban militants in the FATA region. Condemnation of these attacks
was a recurrent topic in the Taliban propaganda. In column 4 of Table 7, we find that the
decline in vaccination rates was greater in districts where more people have heard about
drone attacks on the FATA region. The results are similar when we use the share of people
that oppose those attacks.
Finally, note that the larger negative effect on vaccination rates for girls—described in
section 5—is consistent with parents granting credibility to the rumor that vaccines were a
conspiracy to sterilize Muslim children, girls in particular.
Overall, while none of these measures represents an ideal proxy for exposure to Taliban
propaganda, the pattern of effects is consistent with exposure to the Taliban messages being
a likely driver of the effects presented in this paper. See section 3 in the Online Appendix
for further results and discussion.
53Please note that mainstream media was generally supportive of vaccines and dispelled conspiracy theories
against vaccines. This is consistent with the empirical results presented in this section.
54Note that conditioning on support for the Taliban is important because many religious leaders are not
sympathetic to the tenets of the Taliban.
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Changes in Beliefs or Intimidation
There are different reasons why the demand for vaccines may have changed as a response
to the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. First, parents may have updated their beliefs according
to the messages spread by the Taliban and, hence, may have become more skeptical about
the benefits of vaccination. An alternative channel that could have generated a decline in the
demand for vaccination is intimidation by the Taliban or their supporters. Parents may have
increasingly perceived vaccinating their children as an action in opposition to the Taliban’s
directives and may have feared that vaccination could have led to reprisals by Islamist groups.
In order to assess the relevance of this alternative channel, we use measures of conflict
involving the Taliban from the ACLED data. There were 266 instances of conflict involving
the Taliban in 2010 and 631 instances during the 2010-2013 period. Most of these events of
conflict are classified as battles between the Pakistani security forces and the Taliban.
In Appendix Table 12 we implement a horse-race between these two different hypothesis.
We estimate our baseline specification including simultaneously interactions of the post-
vaccine ruse indicator with our measure of Islamist support and with the number of conflict
events that involved the Taliban. Our estimates of the interaction Post×Islamist support are
unaffected by the inclusion of the interaction term Post×Conflict. Furthermore, the latter
interaction is small and typically statistically insignificant across specifications.55 Hence, this
suggests that ideological proximity to Islamist groups is more closely related to the declines
of vaccines than the violence exerted by the Taliban. This evidence is suggestive that changes
in attitudes and beliefs are a more likely explanation for the decline in vaccination rates than
the threat of violence or reprisals from the Taliban.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the effects of the disclosure of information that damages the
reputation of vaccines on immunization rates. We exploit the disclosure of information on
the vaccine ruse that the CIA carried out in 2011 as part of the operations to locate and
capture Osama Bin Laden. Following the disclosure of this information, the Taliban launched
an intense anti-vaccine propaganda to raise suspicion about vaccines and health workers. It
is likely that these factors eroded parental confidence in vaccines and health workers. There
is substantial anecdotal evidence that suggests this was indeed the case.
Using detailed cohort variation in exposure and district-level variation in ideological
affinity to Islamist groups, we estimate the effects of these events on immunization rates.
55Note that this is not due to lack of variation in our measure of conflict. If we only include the interaction
Post×Conflict the estimates are negative and significant.
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Our estimates are large in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase in support for
Islamist parties is associated with 12 to 20% declines in vaccination rates.
We provide additional empirical evidence that suggests that these effects are likely to be
driven by a reduction in the demand for vaccines. We show that other forms of health seeking
behavior were also negatively affected. Furthermore, our results are robust to controlling
for the intensity of vaccination campaigns measured through detailed administrative data.
We also provide a number of additional pieces of information that support the hypothesis
that the effects are driven by greater exposure to the Taliban propaganda. Regions where
a larger fraction of the population get their news from religious leaders and support the
Taliban experience larger declines in vaccination rates.
Our findings highlight the importance of safeguarding trust in health systems, particularly
in contexts with some underlying level of skepticism in formal medicine. Events that cast
doubt on the integrity of health workers or vaccines can have severe consequences for the
acceptance of health products such as vaccines, that are characterized by having large positive
externalities. This lesson seems particularly relevant at a time when public acceptance of
the new vaccines against Covid-19 is deemed a crucial element in the fight against the virus.
This paper also suggests that events that cast doubts against vaccines can be magnified in
the presence of motivated groups with the objective of seeding mistrust.
A number of related and important questions remain open and deserve further research.
Notably, one key question is whether trust can be regained. Studies that exploit cases
of medical malpractice find that the negative effects on demand for health persist over
multiple generations.56 In contrast, recent experimental evidence suggests that individuals
can increase their levels of trust in government providers upon receiving good news about
state-effectiveness (Acemoglu et al. 2020).57 Our findings are consistent with the notion
that trust can be regained: while we find lower vaccination rates for the children born in the
year after the disclosure of the vaccine ruse, subsequent cohorts exhibit a mitigation of these
negative effects. One explanation for this pattern could be the efforts of vaccination workers
to directly address misconceptions by involving religious leaders that endorsed the usage of
vaccines. However, further research is needed to shed light on the question of whether and
how trust can be regained.
56Alsan and Wanamaker 2017, Lowes and Montero, 2020.
57See also Andrabi and Das (2017).
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Figure 1: Distribution of Electoral Support for MMA
Notes: Map of Pakistan showing the geographic distribution of district-level vote shares for
MMA in the 2008 legislative election.
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Measles Vaccine Age Profile 
Notes: These figures show the fraction of children that received the first dose of each vaccine
by their age at the time of interview. Only the pre-treatment waves of the survey (2008/9
and 2010/11) are used.
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Measles Vaccine Age Profile 
Notes: These figures show the fraction of children that received the first dose of each vaccine
by their age at the time of interview. The figures on the left (right) hand side restrict the
sample to districts in the bottom (top) quartile of vote shares for Islamist parties. The
solid-blue age profiles are obtained from the pre-treatment waves of the survey, 2008/9 and
2010/11. The dashed-red age profiles are obtained from the post-treatment wave, 2012/13.
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Figure 4: Treatment Effects by Monthly Cohort
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Notes: These figures show cohort-specific treatment effects by month of birth. In particular
they show the coefficients on the interaction of Islamist support with the corresponding
cohort indicator. The omitted category corresponds to the last cohort of the non-exposed




Table 1: Effects of the Disclosure of the Vaccine Ruse on Vaccination Rates. Main Results
Polio DPT Measles All Vaccines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.420 0.453 0.278 0.249
Post × Islamist Support -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.057***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 16,788 16,788 12,577 12,577
R-squared 0.260 0.240 0.252 0.258
Number of Clusters 110 110 110 110
Mean Dep. Var. 0.381 0.418 0.278 0.263
Post × Islamist Support -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.049***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 11,294 11,294 12,577 11,294
R-squared 0.275 0.245 0.252 0.271
Number of Clusters 110 110 110 110
Dependent Variables: 
Panel A. 1st Dose of Each Vaccine
Panel B. All Doses of Each Vaccine
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. The unit of observation is the child level. The sample 
consists of children born between January 2010 and July 2012 that are less than 24 months of age at the time of interview. 
We exclude partially treated children: for the first dose of Polio and DPT, we exclude children born between March and 
June 2011; for first dose of measles and the first dose of all vaccines, we exclude children born between July 2010 and 
June 2011. In panel B (with the exception of the results for measles in column 3), we exclude children born between May 
2010 and June 2011. All regressions include district, monthly cohort, monthly age, and calendar month of interview fixed 
effects and a dummy for rural regions. The dependent variables in Panel A take value 1 if the first dose of each vaccine 
was received, 0 otherwise. The dependent variables in Panel B take value 1 if a child has received all doses of a given 
vaccine, 0 otherwise. The outcome for all vaccines takes value 1 if the child has obtained the corresponding dosage of 
the three vaccines.
34
Table 2: Heterogenous Effects by Child’s Gender
Polio DPT Measles All Vaccines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.420 0.453 0.278 0.249
   Mean Dep. Var. for Males 0.426 0.459 0.283 0.256
   Mean Dep. Var. for Females 0.414 0.447 0.273 0.243
Post × Islamist Support -0.045** -0.039** -0.042** -0.044***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Post × Islamist Support x Female -0.028** -0.031** -0.024 -0.029
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 16,788 16,788 12,577 12,577
R-squared 0.260 0.240 0.253 0.258
Number of Clusters 110 110 110 110
Mean Dep. Var. 0.381 0.418 0.278 0.263
   Mean Dep. Var. for Males 0.388 0.424 0.283 0.268
   Mean Dep. Var. for Females 0.373 0.412 0.273 0.257
Post × Islamist Support -0.036* -0.036* -0.042** -0.036**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)
Post × Islamist Support x Female -0.056** -0.048* -0.024 -0.029
(0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 11,294 11,294 12,577 11,294
R-squared 0.276 0.246 0.253 0.272
Number of Clusters 110 110 110 110
Dependent Variables: 
Panel A. 1st Dose of Each Vaccine
Panel B. All Doses of Each Vaccine
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. The sample consists of children born between January 
2010 and July 2012 that are less than 24 months of age at the time of interview. We exclude partially treated children. See 
the notes of Table 1 for details on the excluded cohorts. All regressions include district, monthly cohort, monthly age, and 
calendar month of interview fixed effects and a dummy for rural regions. All regressions include all the double 
interactions: post x female, IslSup x female. The dependent variables in Panel A take value 1 if the first dose of each 
vaccine was received, 0 otherwise. The dependent variables in Panel B take value 1 if a child has received all doses of a 
given vaccine, 0 otherwise. The outcome for all vaccines takes value 1 if the child has obtained the corresponding dosage 
of the three vaccines. 
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Table 3: Effects on the Number of Polio Cases
Share with 
First Dose of 
Polio Vaccine
OLS 2SLS First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.886 33.05
Post July 2011 × Islamist Support 0.828** -1.755***
(0.329) (0.605)
2010 × Islamist Support -0.031
(0.339)
2011 × Islamist Support 1.001*
(0.517)
2014 × Islamist Support 0.624*
(0.370)
Vaccination Rate -0.017 -0.472**
(0.011) (0.231)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 8.41
Observations 458 458 458 458 458
Dependent Variables:
Number of Polio Cases
Reduced Form
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-year. There are 115 districts in the sample. All regressions include 
district and year fixed effects. We obtained data on the cases of poliomyelitis for the years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2014. The variable post takes value 1 
for the years 2011 and thereafter. The share of children with the first dose of the polio vaccine is calculated as the district-level average share of 
children who obtained the first dose of the polio vaccine. In particular, district observations in 2009 and 2010 are assigned the average share of 
children who had obtained the first dose of the polio vaccine and were born prior to the disclosure of the vaccine ruse. District observations in 2011 
and 2014 are assigned the average share of children who had obtained the first dose of the polio vaccine and were born after the disclosure of the 
vaccine ruse. Most of the cases of poliomyelitis detected in 2011 correspond to the end of the year. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Weekly, Vol. 62 No.17, May 2013. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6217.pdf Figure in page 337. (Last accessed on July 5th, 2019)
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Table 4: Main Robustness Checks
Baseline

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Post × Islamist Support -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.044** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.058***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Observations 16,788 16,788 16,788 16,788 16,788 16,758 16,758
R-squared 0.260 0.260 0.263 0.261 0.261 0.260 0.260
Post × Islamist Support -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 16,788 16,788 16,788 16,788 16,788 16,758 16,758
R-squared 0.240 0.240 0.243 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.241
Post × Islamist Support -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.053***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 12,577 12,439 12,577 12,577 12,577 12,557 12,557
R-squared 0.252 0.253 0.256 0.254 0.254 0.252 0.253
Post × Islamist Support -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.046*** -0.040** -0.047*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 12,577 12,439 12,577 12,577 12,577 12,557 12,557
R-squared 0.258 0.260 0.262 0.262 0.263 0.258 0.258
Panel A. First Dose of Polio Vaccine
Panel D. All Vaccines
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. There are 110 parent districts in the baseline sample. The unit of 
observation is the child level. All regressions include district, monthly cohort, monthly age, and calendar month of interview fixed effects and 
a dummy for rural regions. Column 2 adds as controls the mean of the dependent variable for the non-exposed cohorts interacted with yearly 
cohort fixed effects. Column 3 adds controls for district-level measures of access to health services as reported in the 2008/9 PSLM survey, 
respectively interacted with yearly cohort fixed effects. The health measures are the share of mothers that received pre-natal care, post-natal 
care, and tetanus vaccine during previous pregnancy. Column 4 adds controls for share of mothers that had no formal education in 2008/9 
interacted with yearly cohort fixed effects. Column 5 adds as control a district-level measure of nightlight luminosity in the year in which the 
child was born. Column 6 adds as a time-varying control the number of conflict events in the first year of life (excluding protests and riots). 
Column 7 adds controls for the number of conflict events in 2010 interacted with yearly cohort fixed effects.
Panel B. First Dose of DPT Vaccine
Panel C. First Dose of Measles Vaccine
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Table 5: Effects on Health Seeking Behavior







Labor Assisted by 
Traditional Birth 
Attendant
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.190 0.980 0.923 0.330
Post July 2011 × Islamist Support 0.025* -0.023* -0.060**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.027)
[0.010] [0.019]
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.052 -0.109**
(0.032) (0.042)
[0.026] [0.035]
Post × Islamist Support 0.038***
(0.013)
Observations 18,795 3,568 3,568 18,366
R-squared 0.064 0.077 0.152 0.138
Number of Clusters 110 109 109 110
Dependent Variables:
Heckman Selection Model
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. Standard errors derived from a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 bootstrap 
replications in square brackets. The unit of observation is the child level. In Column 4, the sample is restricted to only the youngest child 
born to a mother in the sample. All regressions in Columns 1 to 3 include district fixed effects, quarter of interview fixed effects, monthly 
age fixed effects, and a dummy for rural regions. The regression in Column 4 includes district, monthly cohort, monthly age, and calendar 
month of interview fixed effects and a dummy for rural regions. While Columns 1 to 3 rely on variation in the interview timing, Column 4 
exploits variation in the cohort dimension. The selection equation includes as an excluded instrument a proxy for the disease environment: 
the share of children that are sick in the same quarter and district (excluding a child's own illness status). The formal medical sector 
corresponds to hospital, basic health units and lady health workers. 
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Table 6: Robustness to Controlling for Supply of Health Services
Baseline
First 3 months 
of life
First year of 
life
First 3 months 
of life
First year of 
life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × Islamist Support -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.062***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 16,788 16,654 16,654 16,612 16,612
R-squared 0.260 0.262 0.263 0.261 0.261
Number of Clusters 110 109 109 109 109
Post × Islamist Support -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.059***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 16,788 16,654 16,654 16,612 16,612
R-squared 0.240 0.241 0.242 0.240 0.240
Number of Clusters 110 109 109 109 109
Post × Islamist Support -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.058***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 12,577 12,479 12,479 12,437 12,437
R-squared 0.252 0.253 0.253 0.252 0.252
Number of Clusters 110 109 109 109 109
Post × Islamist Support -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.062***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 12,577 12,479 12,479 12,437 12,437
R-squared 0.258 0.259 0.260 0.258 0.259
Number of Clusters 110 109 109 109 109
Panel B. 1st Dose of DPT Vaccine
Panel C. 1st Dose of Measles Vaccine
Panel D. Full Immunization
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. The unit of observation is the child level. 
The sample consists of children born between January 2010 and July 2012 that are less than 24 months of age 
at the time of interview. We exclude partially treated children. See the notes of Table 1 for details on the 
excluded cohorts. All regressions include district, monthly cohort, monthly age, and calendar month of 
interview fixed effects and a dummy for rural regions. Column 2 and 3 add controls for the number of polio 
vaccination campaigns conducted in the district of residence in the first three months of life and in the first 
year of life, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 add similar controls for number of targeted children during polio 
vaccination campaigns. The number of observations is slightly lower because of missing information on the 
number of targeted children for some periods. The dependent variable in Panels A, B and C take value 1 if the 
first dose of the respective vaccine (Polio, DPT, Measles) was received, 0 otherwise. The dependent variables 
in Panel D take value 1 if a child has received all doses of a given vaccine, 0 otherwise.
Number of 
Immunization Campaigns
Number of Targeted Children 
per Capita in Immunization 
Campaigns
Panel A. 1st Dose of Polio Vaccine
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Table 7: Evidence on Media Consumption & Support for the Taliban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × Islamist Support -0.069**
(0.027)
Post × Not Using Mainstream Media -0.080***
(0.027)
Post × Not Trusing Mainstream Media -0.064***
(0.023)
Post × Support Pak Taliban & Trust Religious Leaders -0.054**
(0.022)
Post × Know of Drone Strikes -0.062***
(0.017)
Observations 13,823 13,823 13,823 13,823 13,823
R-squared 0.257 0.258 0.258 0.256 0.259
Correlation coefficient of key regressor and Islamist Support 1.00 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.25
Number of Clusters 80 80 80 80 80
Dependent Variable: 1st Dose of Polio Vaccine
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. The unit of observation is the child level. The sample consists of children born between 
January 2010 and July 2012 that are less than 24 months of age at the time of interview. We exclude partially treated children. See the table notes of Table 1 
for details on the excluded cohorts. All regressions include district, monthly cohort, monthly age, and calendar month of interview fixed effects and a 
dummy for rural regions. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the first dose of polio vaccine was received, 0 otherwise. The alternative measures used in 
the interaction with the post dummy are calculated using survey data collected by Fair, Kalthenthaler and Miller (2015). Please refer to the Data Appendix 
for a full citation of the data source and a more detailed variable description for these variables.
40
